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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OOO

ALICIA LARSON

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

MARC LARSON,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 930550-CA

District Court No. 10958

:

Priority 4

0O0

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLANTS JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The

Court

of

Appeals

of

the

State

of

Utah

has

jurisdiction to review all final judgments and orders of the
District Courts of the State of Utah pursuant to §78-2-2, Utah Code
Ann. (1953, as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in

modifying the Decree of Divorce to automatically transfer physical
care

and

custody

of

the

parties1

three

minor

children

to

respondent, Marc Larson, if appellant, Alicia Larson, does not

1

reside in Summit County, Utah, thereby failing to allow her to
relocate with the children?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

failing

to award

appellant her attorney's fees and costs in defending respondent's
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce?
3.

Should

appellant

be

awarded

her

reasonable

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal?
The standard of review with regard to the issues of child
custody is whether the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings is so lacking as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence, and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Crouse v. Crouse, 817
P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).

The standard of review with regard to

the issues of attorney's fees is whether they are reasonable,
needed by the recipient and able to be paid by the other party.
Id.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
See Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an action to modify the child custody and
visitation provisions of a Decree of Divorce by changing physical
custody of the parties' three minor children to the non-custodial
parent in the event their primary physical custodian relocates from
Summit County, Utah.

2

B.

Course of the Proceedings,

Defendant/petitioner/appellee,

Marc S. Larson

(hereinafter "Marc"), filed his Verified Petition for Modification
of Decree of Divorce herein on November 6, 1992. (R-76). The case
was tried on April 15, 1993, in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, before the Honorable David
S. Young, judge presiding. The court made its bench ruling at the
conclusion of trial on April 15, 1993. Marc subsequently prepared
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order
Modifying Decree of Divorce, to which appellant timely filed her
Objection on July 12, 1993. This Objection was denied by the trial
court,

which

thereafter

entered

the

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce on
July 26, 1993.
of Law

and

It is from these Findings of Fact and Conclusions

the Order Modifying

plaintiff/respondent/appellant,

Decree of Divorce that the
Alicia

Larson

(hereinafter

"Alicia"), now appeals. Alicia timely filed her Notice of Appeal
on August 24, 1993.
C.

Disposition in Court Below.

The trial court granted Marc's Petition for Modification
of Decree of Divorce, in ordering that the parties should maintain
joint legal custody of their minor children, with Alicia to
continue as their primary physical custodian subject to Marc's
visitation so long as she resides in Summit County, Utah, but if
she leaves Summit County, Utah, then physical custody of the
children would automatically transfer to Marc subject to Alicia's
3

reasonable rights of visitation.

Each party was ordered to bear

his or her own attorney's fees and costs,
D.

Statement of Facts,

Alicia and Marc Larson were divorced on April 29, 1992,
following a marriage of approximately ten years. (R-56, 65) . They
have three minor children, Brandi, born May 26, 1984, April, born
July 20, 1985, and Angie, born October 14, 1987.

(R-66).

At the

time of the divorce, Alicia was a homemaker and not otherwise
employed outside the home. Marc was a self-employed as a physical
therapist and owner of his own therapy business.

(R-58).

The

Decree of Divorce reached by stipulation of the parties provides,
in part, that:
(a)

The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of

the three minor children.

The plaintiff was awarded the primary

physical care, custody and control of the children and the primary
residence of the children was designated with the plaintiff subject
to defendant's right to have the children during reasonable and
liberal times and places to include approximately two and one-half
weekends each month, summer visits and holiday visits.
The parties were to cooperate in fostering one
another's relationship and parental role with the children, inform
one another of important issues in the children's lives to allow
for joint decision-making in the children's upbringing.

In the

event of any disagreement, the parties agreed to first attempt
resolution through mediation.

4

Each party was to give the other a minimum of thirty
days advance written notice prior to relocating from Salt Lake
City, Utah.
(b)

Marc was ordered to pay child support to Alicia in

the total amount of $2,400 per month for the minor children.
(c)

Marc was ordered to pay Alicia $3,000 per month as

alimony for a period of five years.
(d)

An

equitable

distribution

was

ordered,

which

includes a property settlement from Marc to Alicia in the sum of
approximately $86,500 due in April 1997.

(R-66, 67, 68, 71).

The parties and their minor children had lived in Park
City, Summit County, Utah, since 1989.

Alicia and the children

continued to reside together in Park City following entry of the
Decree of Divorce as did Marc in a separate home.

(T-9, 67). In

the summer of 1992 while attending a workshop in Oregon to help
advance her experience and training in her art field, Alicia met
Mr. Pomeroy, who was an instructor in one of her classes.

(T-71).

Alicia and Mr. Pomeroy fell in love and made plans to marry and
thereafter live with the parties' minor children in Corvallis,
Oregon, where Mr. Pomeroy had a home and art studio.

(T-71-72).

In October 1992 as her marriage plans evolved, Alicia notified Marc
of her intended move to Corvallis, Oregon, with the children.
19; Exhibit 1 ) .

(T-

Marc thereafter filed his Verified Petition for

Modification of Decree of Divorce on November 6, 1992, requesting,
among other things, that the divorce be amended to award him
physical custody of the parties1 three minor children if they were
5

unable

to

reach

visitation.

agreement

on

issues

of

child

custody

and

(R-76-81). Alicia then changed her original plans to

move to Oregon with the children in December 1992 to June 1993 in
hopes of making the move more acceptable to Marc, and to do so at
a time when it would be easiest for the children
schooling.

in their

(T-82-83).
By the time of trial on Marc's Petition for Modification

of Decree of Divorce on April 15, 1993, Alicia and Mr. Pomeroy had
set their marriage date in June 1993 in Corvallis, Oregon.

(The

date was set to accommodate the children's attendance at Marc's
brother's wedding in Utah).

(T-71-72). The children were ages 8,

7 and 5 years old, with the youngest child not yet having entered
kindergarten.
Marc was continuing

in his practice as a physical

therapist but had substantially expanded his clinic operations.
(T-9) .

He had always worked hard in his occupation during the

parties' marriage, when he kept work hours from approximately dawn
until the late evenings or nights Monday through Fridays, as well
as Saturday mornings.

(T-90) .

At time of trial and with his

expanded clinic operations, he was now working ten to twelve hour
weekdays, typically from 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. until 6:00 or 7:00 p.m.
or later. In addition, he worked each Saturday morning.

(T-10, 29

and 52) . His enlarged clinic operations now required him to travel
from Park City to Salt Lake City approximately three afternoons
each week.

(T-ll, 31 and 40) . He never takes vacations from work

(T-42), although he wanted to take more time off to be with the
6

children, and testified he would limit his work hours if he were
awarded custody of the parties1 children. Many times he relied on
others to pick up and deliver the children for visitation since the
divorce (T-30), used surrogate care for the children (T-29), and
planned to continue to do so if he were awarded custody of the
children (T-12-13, 30, 39-40, 144).
Marc acknowledged Alicia was a good mother to the
children and that she had always done a very good job as a loving,
nurturing, careful and conscientious caretaker about whom he could
not think of any deficiencies as a parent.

(T-20-23) .

The

testimony of all other witnesses at trial, including those called
by Marc, were in agreement as to his assessment of Alicia as a
mother.

(T-24-25, 29, 50, 57, 96, 175, 183, 185, 192, 200, 120,

Exhibit "6").

Marc characterized the parties1 roles with their

children as very traditional, with Alicia taking care of the
household and children and he as the breadwinner.
the

Decree

of

Divorce, Marc

had

visited

(T-29).

with

the

Since

children

approximately two and one-half weekends per month and had also
eaten lunch with the children one day per week at their school.
(T-14, 91, Exhibit "6").
Marc

filed

his

Petition

to Modify

because

he was

concerned about the children going to live in Oregon with Alicia.
He feared he would be unable to maintain a parental relationship
through daily contact with the children and that they would not be
brought up in the LDS religion.

(T-22, 24-25).

He admitted that

Alicia has generally been cooperative in providing him information
7

on the children and allowing frequent telephone contact.

(T-14,

3 3-34). His relationship with the children is generally encouraged
and there have been no threats to ever prevent him from maintaining
a close relationship with the children.

(T-14, 32-34, 162-163).

Marc believed that Alicia would be open to regular contact and
visitation with the children once they moved to Oregon.

(T-38).

During their marriage in the Spring of 1989, the parties
relocated from Colorado to Park City, Utah.

(T-9, 66-67).

The

parties had relocated with their children seven times within eight
years during their marriage, the most recent occasion being on
their move from Colorado to Park City and Summit County, Utah, in
1989 because Marc wanted to relocate his physical therapy business.
(T-66-67).
Alicia had been a self-supporting stained glass artist
prior to her marriage to Marc in 1983, had been a homemaker during
the marriage completely focused on parenting.

(T-29, 159). In the

divorce settlement, she had agreed to five-year term alimony
because she believed she could re-establish her career after the
divorce within that period of time the parties1 youngest child was
established in elementary school.

(T-70-71).

At the time of trial on Marc's Petition for Modification
of Decree of Divorce, Alicia had begun to re-establish her career
as a fused glass artist, a technical area within the stain glass
art field.

(T-67-68).

She attended a fused glass course in

Oregon, where she met her fiancee, Mr. Pomeroy (T-69), has tried to
work out of her home (T-67) and had unsuccessfully attempted to
8
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workshop, which Alicia would use, allowing her to work at home and
care for the children.

(T-72, 73, 171).

Mr. Pomeroy is a widower with no children.
179).

(T-171, 178-

He has a very good relationship with the parties1 minor

children, is sensitive to their needs and to maintaining their
relationship with Marc.

(T-114, 121, 175, 194-195, Exhibit "6").

His income is sufficient such that he and Alicia can provide a
comfortable lifestyle for the children in Oregon.

(T-146, 171,

177) .
Alicia

has

always

been

extremely

involved

in

the

children's lives, in tune with their differences, likes, dislikes
and needs.

(T-86, 99-101, 105, 106-109, 110-113). She rarely uses

surrogate care for the children.

(T-98).

The children are doing

well in school (Exhibits "3", "4" and "5"), are happy and welladjusted under Alicia's care, and she and the children appear to
share a close relationship.

(T-88, 122, 183, 192, 200). The two

older children need ongoing medical attention for allergies and
infections, which Alicia has always assured they receive. (T-lll113) .
Corvallis, Oregon is a university town with good medical
facilities.

(T-114).

The home where Alicia and the children will

live in Corvallis, Oregon, has a bedroom for each child, is in a
country setting close. It is close to schools that would offer the
children education more specific in meeting their needs than the
education they have received in Park City, Utah.
106-107)•
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i « ideas

tease of t h e
.."

x

had very positive relationships with the children and both were
good parents, with no real parenting deficits.

(T-120) . Although

the children were ambivalent about their move to Oregon and were
experiencing some anxiety, the anxiety was primarily related to the
conflict between the parties over the custody
children were accepting their move to Oregon.

issue and the

They had expressed

no specific desire to live with either parent.

(T-122-124).

The

children were to have the advantage of a two-parent home in Oregon,
and Mr. Peterson believed it was preferable to maintain Alicia as
the children's primary caretaker.

(T-128).

Mr. Peterson's opinion was that it would be extremely
disruptive if Alicia were to live in a separate state from the
children and that it would be more disruptive to the children to be
separated from their primary caretaker mother given Mr. Larson's
busy work schedule and need to utilize surrogate care.
144).

(T-143-

Mr. Peterson noted that Marc's desire for custody was

perceived to be of short duration.

His primary interest was in

having frequent contact with the children rather than actually
wanting custody. His legal action was viewed more as an attempt to
prevent Alicia from moving from the area, rather than gaining
custody for himself.
professional

(Exhibit "6" at page 17).

opinion, Marc could continue

In Mr. Peterson's

in a strong joint

custodial relationship with the children living in Oregon through
an appropriate visitation schedule to include blocks of time during
summers and holiday periods with the children.

(T-128-129).

He

believed Alicia would cooperate with such a schedule (T-131), and
12
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as
Fc , ::: I:

pertaining to the issues for review specifically included the
following:
4.
Plaintiff has been the primary
caretaker for the parties1 minor children, but
defendant has had a significant, active, open
involvement in their lives.
Defendant has
fulfilled a traditional role in the children's
lives; that is he is the breadwinner and
plaintiff has been the person designated to
raise the children,
5.
Notwithstanding the plaintiff has
been the primary caretaker, the children are
nearly equally bonded to both parents.
Defendant is extremely committed to his
children and wishes to be involved in their
lives.
6.
Plaintiff and defendant are each
excellent parents. Each is equally capable of
caring for the children.
7.
At best, it is speculative whether a
move to Corvallis, Oregon would be successful
or permanent.
In the summer of 1992,
plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in
Corvallis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated
that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry.
However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff have not
yet married, and there is potential for
conflict if the family were to move in with
Mr. Pomeroy.
Nothing about the move to
Corvallis, Oregon would enhance the children's
educational environment nor plaintiff's career
potential.
It is a high risk move for
plaintiff and the children.
8.
Defendant
has
exercised
all
visitation that has been allowed by plaintiff
and has sought additional visitation. He has
been involved in the children's school and has
been an attentive, caring parent.
9.
The children do not wish to move to
Corvalis, Oregon.
10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim
Peterson, recommended that the children remain
in the physical custody of plaintiff, he
indicated in his report that it would be in
14

the children's best interests to remain in
Utah and reading his report as a whole, it is
clear that the recommendation was a close
call. The present custodial arrangements have
fostered happy well-adjusted lives for the
children.
11. A] though ther e ai e i 10 defects in
plaintiff's
capacity
or willingness
to
function as a parent, there is some question
about plaintiff's stability because of her
several changes cf residence during the year
since the < ""**":.
" decree of divorce
herein.
12. Both parents have an equal depth of
an long term desire for custody. The father
has shown a commitment to the children.
1** Defendant would provide personal
care £
the children by reducing the hours
that he works and would also be required to
provide some surrogate care.
] 4 ., During the marriage, ooth pare
and the children attended the LDS Church and
were active in the LDS Church.
Since t-^e
separation of the parties, plai/tif
ceased to be active in the LDS Church.
Defendant remains active and wishes to keep
the children active in the LDS Church- The
court finds that it is unlikely that# if the
children were to move to Corvallis, Oregon,
plaintiff would continue their religious
training.
15. The maj oritj i)f the childrenf s
extended family, including aunts, uncles, and
cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah.
Defendant's children from his prior marriage,
half-sister
and
half-brother
to
these
children, also live in Utah. these children
have an excellent relationship with their
older half-sister and half-brother. They have
many friends and connections in Utah.
]6
? i move to Corvalis, Oregon is not in,
the children's best interests; it is in the
best interests of the children to remain in
Summit County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to
continue to reside in Summit County, the
children will remai n primarily in her physical
15

custody. If, however, plaintiff determines to
move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical
custody of the children should be transferred
to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal
visitation,
17. Plaintiff did not keep defendant
informed of the development of her plans to
move, or has not kept defendant fully advised
of the children's activities in school. Each
party should be admonished to keep the other
fully informed about the children's activities
and welfare.
18. Plaintiff has not shown a need for
assistance with payment of her attorney's
fees.
(R-213-215).

The court concluded that the Petition for

Modification should be granted, that the parties should maintain
joint legal custody of their children but if plaintiff, Alicia
Larson, decides to move from Summit County, Utah, then physical
custody of the children should be transferred to defendant subject
to reasonable and liberal visitation and that each party should
bear his or her own attorneys' fees and costs.

(R-216) . An Order

Modifying Decree of Divorce was entered consistent therewith.
(R-283-284).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I
The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the
Decree of Divorce to automatically transfer physical custody of the
parties' three minor children from Alicia if she does not reside in
Summit County, Utah, thereby preventing her from relocating where
better opportunities exist for herself and the children.

The

Findings of Fact of the trial court are not supported by the
16

evidence and are so contrary to the weight of the evidence that
they are clearly erroneous and must be overturned•

When viewed in

light of the overall evidence and contrary evidence, the facts
cannot be supported and the court's ruling modifying the Decree of
Divorce must be reversed.
The

substantial

weight

of the evidence

supports a

continuing child custody award with Alicia as the children's
primary physical caretaker whether in Utah or in Oregon. A review
of the marshalled evidence on those factors which the court should
consider in determining the custody placement of the parties' minor
children strongly favors the parties' past custodial relationship.
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling modifying the Decree of
Divorce should be reversed.
Point II
The

court

committed

error

in

considering

Alicia's

personal religious beliefs as a factor in determining the best
custody placement of the parties' minor children. The Constitution
of Utah precludes any law establishing religion or prohibiting the
free exercise of it by considering Alicia's religiousness.

The

State, through the trial court, improperly intonates that parents
who choose not to observe a certain religious faith are subject to
having their custodial rights jeopardized because of that choice.
This impinges on Alicia's right to practice her religion as she
deems appropriate, thereby violating Utah's free exercise clause.
Accordingly, the trial court's ruling modifying the
Decree

of

Divorce

based

upon
17

its

perception

of

Alicia's

religiousness should be reversed and the parties1 prior custodial
arrangement under the terms of the Decree of Divorce reinstated.
Point III
The trial court erred in ordering that custody of the
children automatically transferred to Marc in the event of Alicia's
relocation from Summit County and in failing to allow her to
relocate with the children to Oregon.

The court inappropriately

weighed the desires and best interests of Marc in exercising
weekend visits with the children rather than the best interests of
the children in remaining in the custody of the children's involved
caretaker

mother.

This

is particularly

inappropriate

where

Alicia's relocation promises opportunities for herself and the
children and the evidence shows Marc will be able to maintain his
parental relationship with the children in the event of the move.
The trial court's ruling jeopardizes the long-term security and
best interests of the children by failing to allow Alicia to seek
economic self-sufficiency as was anticipated by the parties at the
time of the Decree of Divorce in order to assist in providing for
the parties' minor children.

Where her relocation

is well-

conceived and has no ill motive, then it should be allowed.
Point IV
The testimony was clear that Marc had sufficient income
to assist Alicia in payment of her attorney's and costs incurred at
the trial.

She had no income except his support and alimony

payments. The total amount requested was reasonable, there was no
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objection thereto, and the amount should, therefore, be awarded to
Alicia.
Point V
This

Court

has the

authority

to

award

Alicia

the

attorney's fees and costs that she has incurred in prosecuting and
maintaining this appeal. Based upon the significant errors in law
committed at the trial level, an award of attorney's fees on appeal
is appropriate.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
MODIFYING
THE
DECREE
OF
DIVORCE
TO
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFER PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE
PARTIES' THREE MINOR CHILDREN FROM ALICIA IF
SHE DOES NOT RESIDE IN SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH,
THEREBY PREVENTING HER FROM RELOCATING WHERE
BETTER OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR HERSELF AND THE
CHILDREN.
A.

The Findings of Fact bv the trial court are not

supported bv the evidence and are so contrary to the weight of the
evidence that they are clearly erroneous and must be overturned.
It is well-established that a party challenging a finding
by a trial court must marshall the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the
findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).

Crouse

The trial court's

decision regarding custody will not be upset absent of showing of
an abuse of discretion or manifested injustice. Barnes v. Barnes,
857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156,
19

159 (Utah App. 1989).

The trial court's findings upon which it

based its ruling were inadequate when considered in light of the
overall evidence and contrary evidence as follows:
1.

The court found that: "Notwithstanding the plaintiff

has been the primary caregiver, the children are nearly equally
bonded to both parents.

Defendant is extremely committed to his

children and wishes to be involved in their lives."

(R-214).

The

evidence in support of this finding was that although the children
were nearly equally bonded to both parents, they were most probably
more closely bonded to Alicia than to the defendant, Marc, in the
opinion of the child custody evaluator.

(Exhibit "6", T-125-126).

Although the court found that the defendant was extremely committed
to his children and wished to continue to be involved in their
lives, the evidence showed no strong commitment to assume primary
care

of

the

children.

Defendant's

Verified

Petition

for

Modification of the Decree of Divorce sought to keep the children
in Utah under the present custodial arrangement where he was a
visiting parent, but if no agreement between the parties could be
reached, then he desired to be awarded physical custody of the
children.

(R-79). In the opinion of the custody evaluator, Marc's

interest in physical custody of the children was fleeting, his real
interest being to maintain bi-weekly contact with the children by
attempting to prevent Alicia from moving from the area.
"6").

(Exhibit

Marc's testimony at trial indicated that his commitment and

desire to be involved in the children's lives was focused more on
his fear that he would be unable to maintain his past weekend
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visitation with children if they were to move with Alicia rather
than a desire and ability to assume physical custody.

(T-24). He

realized he was unable to care for the children as a primary
custodian, except during the school year when the children would be
in school during weekdays.
2.

(T-42-43).

The court also found that:

"7. It is extremely speculative whether a
move to Corvallis, Oregon, would be successful
or permanent.
In the summer of 1992,
plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in
Corvallis, Oregon, and plaintiff indicated
that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry.
However, Mr. Pomeroy and plaintiff have not
yet married, and there is a potential for
conflict if the family were to move in with
Mr. Pomeroy.
Nothing about he move to
Corvallis,
Oregon,
would
enhance
the
children's
educational
environment
nor
plaintiff's career potential. It is a high
risk move for and the children."
There is very little, if any, evidence in support of
this finding.

There is no evidence whatsoever that the move to

Corvallis, Oregon, would not be successful and permanent.

The

evidence showed that Alicia planned to marry and live in Corvallis,
Oregon, with her fiancee who had lived in the same house for
approximately ten years.

(T-72, 169).

There was no evidence

whatsoever to suggest that there is potential for conflict if the
family were to move in with Mr. Pomeroy. The evidence was contrary
to this finding.

Mr. Pomeroy was a stable person, having a good

relationship with Alicia and the children and was sensitive to the
children's needs and relationship with Marc.
175) .

(T-169, 171, 174,

He earned a good income sufficient to support the new

household in his home.

(T-177, 146). The child custody evaluator

opined that Mr. Pomeroy was a positive factor in the lives of the
children (T-121, 122) , and a two-parent home was definitely in the
children's best

interests.

(T-128, 138).

Furthermore, the

evidence was contrary to the court's finding that the move to
Corvallis, Oregon, would not enhance the children's educational
environment or plaintiff's career potential and that it was a high
risk move for the plaintiff and the children. The evidence clearly
demonstrated

that

there

were

significant

advantages

to

the

children's educational environment in Corvallis, Oregon, because
the school system there addresses the children's specific needs in
a way that was not done in Summit County, Utah.

(T-106-107) .

There was no evidence that plaintiff had any career potential in
Utah to establish an earning capacity prior to the termination of
her alimony award.

All evidence demonstrated that her career

potential would be enhanced by a relocation to Corvallis, Oregon,
which was the center of her glass fusing trade and where she could
teach and work from her home.
3.

(T-72-74, 198-199, 204).

The court further found that:

"9. The children did not wish to move to
Corvallis, Oregon." (R-215).
There is no evidence that supports this finding.
Most of the evidence was that the children were ambivalent (i.e.
conflicted)

about moving to Corvallis, Oregon, but they had

accepted the move with some anxiety due primarily to the custody
issue in general rather than their anticipated relocation.
122).

(T-

The children did not express a desire to live with one
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parent or the other, nor were they asked to make that decision.
(T-124).
4.

The court also found that:

"10. Although the custody evaluator, Kim
Peterson, recommended that the children remain
in the physical custody of plaintiff, he
indicated in his report that it would be in
their best interests to remain in Utah. In
reading his report as a whole, it is clear
that the recommendation was a close call. The
present custodial arrangements have fostered
happy, well-adjusted lives for the children."
(R-215).
While there was evidence that the ideal situation
would be for Alicia and her fiancee to reside in Summit County, Mr.
Petersen recognized that it may not be possible.

(Exhibit "6" at

page 17). His opinion was that it would be extremely disruptive
and contrary to the children's best interests if Alicia were to
live in a separate state from the children (T-143) , and that it
would be more disruptive to the children for them to be separated
from Alicia, who had always been their primary caretaker than for
them to live in a separate state from their father.
5.

(T-143-144).

The court also found that:

"11. Although there are no defects in
plaintiff's
capacity
or willingness to
function as a parent, there is some question
about plaintiff's stability because of her
several changes of residence during the years
since the entry of the Decree of Divorce."
(R-215).
Although there was clearly evidence that Alicia had
changed her home twice in Park City since the Decree of Divorce,
there is no evidence whatsoever that these moves should raise any
question about her stability.

She moved from the marital home

because she could not afford to maintain and Marc suggested that
she do so. Each move was deliberated and considered by Alicia with
respect to the children's needs and each move was made to meet
those needs.
6.

(T-38, 75-81).
The court found that:

"12. Both parents have an equal depth and
long-term desire for custody. The father has
shown a commitment to the children." (R-215).
The evidence did not demonstrate that both parents have
an equal depth and long-term desire for custody.
the

evidence

indicated

that Marc

recognized

To the contrary,
he was not

in a

position to accept long-term custody because of his work schedule.
(T-12, 29, 39, 42-43).
legal

relationship

His concern was in continuing his joint

with

the

regular and frequent basis.

children

through visitation

on a

(T-24).

Conversely, the evidence

showed Alicia had a long-term desire for custody and depth of
desire by involvement in every aspect of the children's lives in
detail and on a daily basis.
111, 182, 192, 200).

(T-86, 88, 98, 99-102, 105-106, 109-

When asked by the trial judge whether she

would sacrifice her personal happiness to stay with the children in
Utah, her response was affirmative.
7.

(T-168).

The court found that:

"14.
...it is unlikely that if the children
were to move to Corvallis, Oregon, plaintiff
would continue their religious training." (R215).
There is absolutely no evidence that it would be unlikely
the children would continue in their religious training on a move
to Corvallis, Oregon. All evidence demonstrated otherwise. Though
24

Alicia did not attend Marc's LDS ward, she delivered and picked the
children up from his church each Sunday so they could attend those
services with Marc, even on the weekends when he did not visit with
the children.

(T-149-150).

She attends each religious event

associated with the children's religious upbringing.

(T-35). She

felt it very important for the children to continue in their
religious training and agreed with those ideals.

(T-35, 148-151).

Furthermore, the evidence clearly demonstrated that Alicia had
investigated the churches in the area where the children would be
living in Oregon and planned to support them in their religious
endeavors there.

(T-148-149).

Clearly, the foregoing demonstrates subjectively that the
court's specific findings supporting its Order Modifying the Decree
of Divorce were contrary and not supported by the great weight of
the evidence. Accordingly, these findings should be set aside. It
is a well established principle of appellate law that an appellate
court in an equitable action, such as child custody, can review, de
novo, all the evidence presented at trial and make its own findings
and conclusions if it chooses to do so and if equity and justice
require it.

[See Wright v. Wright. 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978) and

Wall v. Wall. 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985)]. This court should enter
its own findings to prevent a substantial injustice to Alicia and
a result contrary to the children's best interests with regard to
their continuing care and well being.
B.

The substantial weight of the evidence supports a

continuation of the parties' child custody arrangement and orders
25

of the Decree of Divorce with regard to whether or not Alicia and
the children relocate outside Summit County, Utah.
The child custody orders of the parties' Decree of
Divorce awarded them joint legal custody of their three minor
children. Alicia was awarded the primary physical care and custody
of the children and her residence was designated as the children's
primary

residence, subject to Marc's visitation rights on a

standard schedule.

(R-66-67).

This Order essentially confirmed

the parties' historical relationship and roles with the children
during the length of the parties' marriage and following the entry
of the Decree of Divorce.

Alicia has always been the primary

caretaker of the children.

They have always lived with her and,

except for the children's schooling, she has always provided their
personal care and does not use surrogate care.
The sole well-established standard the court must apply
in determining whether any change in circumstances supports a
change in the child custody orders is the best interests of the
children.

Joraensen v. Jorcrensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979).

The

court's primary focus must always been on the best interests of the
children rather than on the parties, their conduct and desires.
See e.g. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989) . The
Utah Supreme Court has set forth certain relevant factors which
must be considered by the trial court in child placement cases. As
articulated in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982):
"Some factors the court may consider in
determining
the
best
interests
relate
necessary to the children's feelings or
special needs. The preference of the child;
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keeping siblings together; the relative
strength of the child's bond to one or both of
the
prospective
custodians;
and,
in
appropriate cases, the general interest in
continuing
previously
arranged
custody
arrangements where the child is happy and
well-adjusted. Other factors relate primarily
to the prospective custodian's character or
status or to their capacity or willingness to
function as a parent; moral character and
emotional stability; duration and depth of
desire for custody; ability to provide
personal
rather
than
surrogate
care;
significant impairment of ability to function
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive
drinking or other cause; reasons for having
relinquished custody in the past; religious
compatibility
with the
child; kinship,
including any extraordinary circumstances;
step-parent
status;
and
financial
considerations." Id. at 41.
Some of these factors have since been codified in §30-310, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), requiring the court to
consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standard of each of the parties. They have also
been summarized in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), where
the court held that:
"...the choice of competing child custody
claims should... be based on function-related
factors.
Common among these, though not
exclusive, is the identity of the primary
caretaker during the marriage. Other factors
should include the identity of the parent with
greater flexibility to provide personal care
for the child and the identity of the parent
with whom the child has spent most of his or
her time pending a custody determination, if
that period has been lengthy.
Another
important
factor
is the
stability
of
environment provided by each parent." Id. at
118.
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The evidence at trial in this matter on these factors to
be considered by the trial court in child custody cases was as
follows:
1.
dispute

Identity of the primary caretaker.

whatsoever

that Alicia

had

always

been

There was no
the primary

caretaker of the children during the marriage and until the time of
trial.

Marc acknowledged as much, and the trial court so found.

(T-29, R-214).

The evidence was quite clear that Marc had

historically been self-employed and working long hours from early
mornings to many times late nights during each weekday, and in
addition for at least half of each Saturday.

(T-10, 29, 52, 90).

This continued to be his work schedule at time of trial, even
though he stated his intent to reduce his hours if the children
were to live with him.
2.

(Id., T-ll).

Ability to provide personal care. The evidence was

clear that Alicia had been a homemaker, primary caretaker to the
children and did not rely on surrogate care.

(T-28, 98). There

was no evidence that Marc would be in a position to provide
personal care for the children rather than relying on surrogate
care, and all evidence indicated that he would have to do so.
(T-10,12, 29, 30, 39, 40, 42).

The trial court also so found.

(R-215).
3.

Time with primary caretaker. The evidence was clear

and undisputed that the children had lived with Alicia since their
birth, spending weekend visitation time with Marc.
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(T-29, 91).

4.
that

the

Stability of environment. The evidence demonstrated

parties

approximately

and

their

children

had

historically

moved

each year during their marriage but have been

residing in Park City, Utah, for four years prior to the date of
trial.

(T-16, 66).

Each party had changed residences.

The

evidence clearly showed that Alicia deliberated and considered the
children's interests and needs whenever she had to change their
home and that the children's environment continued to be stable and
meet their specific needs.
5.

(T-75-81).

Children's feelings or special needs. The children

were probably more closely bonded to Alicia than to Marc, although
both parents were good parents. (T-125, Exhibit "6" at page 16).
The children were ambivalent about moving to Corvallis, Oregon, but
had accepted that move.

(T-122). It would be extremely disruptive

to the children if they were to live in a separate state from their
mother.

(T-143-144) .

The children have special medical needs,

which Alicia has always met.
6.

(T-lll-113).

Preference of the child. The children expressed no

preference between the parents.
7.

(T-122-124).

Strength of the child's bond to the parents.

The

children were probably more closely bonded to Alicia than to Marc,
although both parents were good parents. (T-125).

It would be

extremely disruptive to the children if they were to live in a
separate state from their mother.

(T-143-144). The children have

special medical needs, which Alicia has always met.
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(T-lll-113).

8.

Adjustment of the child.

The children were happy

and well-adjusted with Alicia, who had always done a good job of
raising them in the assessment of both Marc and the child custody
evaluator.

(T-22-25, Exhibit "6").

There was no evidence that the

children had become unhappy nor were they maladjusted in Alicia's
care.
Custodianfs character or status or capacity or

9.

willingness to function as a parent.
parents.

Both parties were good

Marc acknowledged Alicia as being a very concerned,

conscientious, attentive, loving and nurturing caretaker.
25).

(T-23-

The court found no defects in plaintiff's capacity or

willingness to function as a parent.
10.

(R-215).

Moral character and emotional stability. There was

no question that the parties were of good moral character and
emotionally

stable.

There was no evidence of any emotional

instability on the part of either party.
11.
defendant

Duration and depth of desire for custody.

testified

that

he

wanted

to

maintain

his

The
close

relationship with the children and was prepared to assume their
physical custody.

(T-ll, 24). However, his primary concern was in

maintaining regular contact with the children to continue in his
parenting role.

(T-24).

The child custody evaluator did not

perceive Marc's desire for physical custody to be long-term.
(Exhibit "6" at page 16).

Marc's interest in the children was

perceived as not one desirous of physical custody but rather of
keeping the children available for him to visit.
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(Exhibit "6" at

page 16). Alicia's detailed involvement in every aspect of the
childrenfs well-being over the course of their lives clearly
demonstrates the duration and depth of her desire for continued
custody.

If faced with the choice of sacrificing her personal

happiness in marriage to being available to care for the children,
she would chose to be with the children.
12.

(T-168).

Impairment of ability to function as a parent.

Neither parent had any impairment of their ability to function as
a parent.
13.

Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past.

Marc agreed for Alicia to continue in her parenting role with the
children as their primary caretaker, and that is the basis upon
which the child custody orders reflected in the Decree of Divorce
were made.

(R-55-65).

Alicia has never relinquished custody of

the children.
14.

Religious compatibility with the children. Marc is

concerned that the children will be brought up in the religion he
practices, the LDS faith, and fears that Alicia will not support
the children in that training.

(T-20-23).

However, the evidence

clearly shows Alicia to be completely compatible with the children
and their religious interests, though she may not attend Marc's LDS
church.

(T-35, 148-150).

She takes the children to church each

Sunday and picks them up after the service.
their religious events.
interests and values.

(T-35).

She attends

She shares their religious

(T-149-150, 35).
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(T-149).

There was no evidence

whatsoever

that Alicia

was

incompatible

with

the

children's

religious interests.
15.

Kinship and step-parent status.

Both parties are

natural parents to the minor children, and there is no issue of
kinship between the parties and the children. The evidence clearly
showed that Alicia's fiancee had a good relationship with the
children and was a positive factor in the children's future,
encouraging their relationship with Marc.
16.

Financial considerations.

(T-175-176).
There was no evidence

that the parties could not financially care for the children, and
the evidence was clear that the children would be adequately
provided for in Corvallis, Oregon.

(T-146).

On all of the evidence presented upon the relevant
factors

to

be

considered

in determining

the best

interests

placement of the parties' minor children, the great weight of
evidence is to maintain the current custodial arrangement, with
Alicia having primary care and custody of the children. There was
no evidence that Marc could not maintain his relationship with the
children if Alicia and the children were to relocate to Corvallis,
Oregon.

In the opinion of the child custody evaluator, Marc's

relationship

with

the

children

could

be

maintained

on

an

appropriate visitation schedule as he recommended, and Alicia would
support Marc's relationship with the children. (T-128-130; Exhibit
"6" at page 17) . On a de novo review of all the evidence presented
at trial, this

court

should

reverse the trial court ruling

automatically transferring physical custody of the parties' minor
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children to Marc if Alicia chooses to relocate with the children to
Corvallis, Oregon, and permit her to do so. Upon a review of all
of the evidence by this court and the issue of child custody
placement, the findings are so lacking in support of the trial
court's ruling and the clear weight of the evidence supports Alicia
continuing as the children's primary custodian. The ruling of the
trial court which may disallow this arrangement to continue is
clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
Point II
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING ALICIA'S
PERSONAL RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AS A FACTOR IN
DETERMINING THE CHILD CUSTODY PLACEMENT OF THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILDREN.
One of the factors that the court may consider in child
custody placement cases under the Hutchinson, supra, holding, is
the religious compatibility between the parent and the children.
In this case, there was no evidence whatsoever that Alicia and the
children had any religious incompatibility.

The court improperly

considered Alicia's personal religiousness and the manner she
chooses to practice her religion as a factor to denying her the
right to continue as the children's primary custodian and caretaker
in Corvallis, Oregon.

Specifically, the trial court stated that:

"The mother, while she testifies that she is
in favor of the children having religious
training consistent with their life, and that
is a part of their life, the move to Corvallis
is not compatible with the religious training
that has been provided to the children. The
mother does not intend to attend religious
services. It is not very practical to take
five, seven and eight year old children and
drop them off, and she said she would go with
them when they go there. I think that smacks

of the incredulous.
She does not have a
commitment to the religion. And to think that
she is going to go there to foster it causes
me to doubt her credibility.
I just don't
think she would do it, and I don't think I
would expect her to do it. So, it is far more
compatible for the children to remain in their
religious environment in which they are
present in." (T-237-238).
The Supreme Court of Idaho decided the case of Osteraas
v. Osteraas. 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993), which is strikingly similar
to the Larson case. In Osteraas, the parties were divorce in 1986
and awarded the joint legal custody of their two twin sons, with
the mother awarded physical custody and the father awarded rights
of visitation.

In 1990, the father moved for a change of physical

custody in response to the mother's intent to remarry and move to
another state.

The trial court, known as the Magistrate Court,

granted the father's Petition to Modify custody and awarded him
custody of the children for nine months of the years, with the
mother having custody during the summer.

The trial court found

that the parents were equal in almost all respects.

However, the

scales tipped in favor of the father having custody based upon the
"religion" factor.

The district court reversed the trial court's

decision, finding that the lower court had improperly considered
the religious issue in determining custody.
the ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court.

The father appealed

The trial court had found

that the mother was not active in any religion and had not been for
some period of time and that the father, although not active in his
religion, was more likely to teach the children good character
traits based upon his religious background.
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The Idaho Supreme Court held that:
"Breaching the rule of religious noninterference
as to
custody
proceedings
implicates both the free exercise and antiestablishment clauses.
U.S. Constitution
Amendment I. When the state, speaking through
its court, intimates that parents who choose
not to observe a certain (or indeed, any)
religious faith are subject to having their
custodial rights jeopardized because of that
choice, then the import will be to force upon
each of those parents a painful and
unconscionable decision to either hold to
their own beliefs or maintain custody of their
children. Such a decision would thus impinge
upon their right to choose and adhere to their
own respective beliefs, thereby violating the
free exercise clause." Id. at 952.
The Idaho court further held that:
"The other affect of utilizing the religion
factor in deciding custody disputes is that
the courts will be seen as appearing to favor
one religion over another, or favor religion
in general as against no declared religion,
thus using the factor would serve to establish
such religion in contravention to the First
Amendment Establishment Clause because it
would have the primary effect of advancing
religion... It is thus clear that the trial
court's distinction between religion and lack
thereof cannot prevail against provisions
stated in the United States Constitution."
Citations omitted.
Like the Idaho Constitution, the Constitution of Utah
Section 4 states that:

"The State shall make no law respecting

establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
...nor shall church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions."
It is clear that the court took into consideration the
fact that Alicia does not intend to attend religious services. In
so doing, the court not only interfered with Alicia's religious
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freedom but also appears to have favored religion in general over
Alicia's decision not to be involved in organized religion and this
time.

In making its decision, therefore, the court made specific

findings that plaintiff has ceased to be active in the LDS Church
and that, furthermore, the court did not believe she would continue
the children's religious training in the LDS Church. Clearly this
favors religion as well as interfering with Alicia's free exercise
thereof in direct violation not only of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, but also Section 1 and Section 4 of the
Constitution of Utah.
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN WEIGHING THE DESIRES
AND BEST INTERESTS OF MARC RATHER THAN THOSE
OF
THE
PARTIES'
MINOR
CHILDREN
IN
AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRING PHYSICAL CUSTODY
FROM THE CHILDREN'S PRIMARY CARETAKER IN THE
EVENT OF HER RELOCATION FROM SUMMIT COUNTY,
UTAH. AND IN FAILING TO ALLOW HER TO RELOCATE
WITH THE CHILDREN TO CORVALLIS. OREGON.
The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their
three minor children under the terms of the Decree of Divorce, with
Alicia being awarded their primary care and custody and residence
designated as that of the children. This child custody order does
not give Marc the right to determine where Alicia should live with
the children or where their residence should be; their residence is
simply to be with her. Where a parental right is not specifically
addressed in the terms of a joint legal custody order, then that
parental right may be exercised by the parent having physical
custody of the child the majority of the time.
10.3(4), Utah Code Ann. (1993).

Section 3 0-3-

Pursuant to this statute, Alicia
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has the right to determine where she and the children shall live.
She should be entitled to exercise this right unless it is clearly
contrary to the children's best interests.
The only changed circumstance in this case which would
support a modification of the child custody and visitation awards
is the plaintiff's anticipated relocation to the State of Oregon
with the parties' three minor children to marry her fiancee and
live with him in his home in Oregon.
standard

the

court

must

apply

in

The sole well-established
determining

whether

this

anticipated change of circumstances supports a change in the child
custody orders is the best interests of the children. Jorcrensen,
supra.

The personal

irrelevant

unless

desire and conduct of the parents is

it has

an

impact

on

the

children's best

interests.
Marc's expressed

desire and concerns in seeking to

prevent Alicia and the children from moving to Corvallis, Oregon,
are focused on his perception that the geographical distance
between him and the children will prevent him from continuing in
his parental role, traditionally the breadwinner and now visiting
parent to the children approximately two and one-half weekends each
month.

(T-24, 29, 91, 41). The child custody evaluator testified

that the good relationship Marc currently has with the parties'
minor children could be maintained through the visiting schedule he
recommended.

(T-128-129, Exhibit "6" at 17).

Despite this

evidence, the trial court determined that the children should be
cared for and reside in Summit County, Utah, where their father
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lives, and if Alicia desires to relocate, then the children will be
cared for by their father in order to preserve and promote that
relationship.
The question of whether it is in the best interests of
the children to transfer custody to the non-custodial parent where
the custodial parent plans to move with the children to another
state has been examined by many courts within the Pacific Reporter
region. In most all instances, the courts allow the children to be
relocated where there is a legitimate reason in the children's best
interests for the custodial parent's relocation to another state.
See e.g. Lorenz v. Lorenz, 242 Mont. 62 788 P.2d 328

(1990),

determining that a custodial parent is presumptively entitled to
change her own and the child's residence where the mother was the
primary custodian and did not intend to work outside the home while
the father was fully employed; Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299
(N.M.

1991),

the primary physical custodial was entitled to

relocate with the parties' minor children to a distant area where
her family lived and she could find employment; Ditto v. Ditto, 628
P. 2d 777

(Or. App. 1981) where the custodial was allowed to

relocate to New Zealand with the children, the court noting the
happiness and well-being of the custodial parent is an ingredient
of the welfare of the children; and most recently in Love v. Love,
851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993), the primary physical custodian of the
minor children was granted leave to relocation with the parties'
minor child where the parties' had exercised a divided custody
arrangement.
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In the

Love

case, the Wyoming

court

examined

and

summarized the "wide array of standards, tests and presumptions
that have been applied in relocation cases in other jurisdictions"
(Id. at 1287) and held that relocation will be allowed so long as
the custodial parent has good motives for the move and that mere
inconvenience to the non-custodial parent must be shown to defeat
the custodial parent's right to relocate. There the children were
happy and well-adjusted under the care of their mother, who desired
to relocate from Wyoming to South Dakota to further her career
where opportunities were not available to do so in Wyoming.

The

mother, as is Alicia, was supporting herself under a durational
alimony award due to terminate.

The father including exercising

weekend and summer visitation rights and participating in the
children's extracurricular activities.
In allowing the custodial parent to relocate with the
children, the court noted that:
"...Our review looks more closely at balancing
the continued rights of the parties with the
best interests of the children as established
at the time of the divorce. We will consider
the attributes and characteristics of the
parents and children and how the children have
fared
under
the
original
custody
and
visitation arrangement. We will consider also
whether the relocating parent's motives for
proposing the move are legitimate, sincere, in
good faith and whether reasonable visitation
is possible for the remaining parent." Id. at
1288.
The analysis applied by the Wyoming court in Love is
similar to the examination of the parties' roles with regard to the
upbringing of their children that the courts in Utah apply, as
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reflected in the Hutchinson and Pusev decisions, supra; where the
children are happy and well-adjusted under the care of their
primary caretaker parent, then that person should continue to be
allowed to so act.

It is particularly important and in the best

interests of the children that Alicia Larson be allowed to continue
in her parenting role with the children as their primary caretaker
and to relocate with them to Corvallis, Oregon, where there clearly
are great opportunities for enhancing her life and the children's
lives.

Although this relocation would result in inconvenience to

Mr. Larson, there is no evidence that indicates he would be unable
to continue in his parental role with the children and that Alicia
would not encourage that relationship.
Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD
ALICIA HER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED
IN DEFENDING DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) grants trial courts the
power to award attorneys' fees in a divorce action. See Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d

836, 840

(Utah App. 1991).

In making an

attorneys' fee award, the decision must be based upon "evidence of
the receiving spouse's financial need for attorneys' fees, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
award."

Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559 (Utah App. 1993).
In the Larson case, the court concluded that Alicia had

now shown the need for assistance with payments of her attorney's
fees and, therefore, ordered that both parties should pay their own
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fees and costs.

This finding is contrary to the evidence and

constitutes error by the trial court.
The evidence established that Marc Larson had adjusted
gross income in 1991 of approximately $150,000 from his clinic
business.

(T-144, Exhibit "2").

In addition, Marc anticipated

that his 1992 income would be fairly close to what it was in 1991.
(T-44) .

Alicia, on the other hand, testified that she had no

taxable income and her only source of income was alimony and child
support.

In spite of this evidence, the court found that Alicia

had not shown a need for assistance with payment of attorney's
fees.

(T-76).
Alicia's attorney proffered testimony that the total

expenses, fees and costs incurred in relation to the defense of
Marc's Petition to Modify was $4,677.40 plus an additional $400
which was paid directly to the custody evaluator, for a grand total
of $5,077.40. Mr. Sheaffer further testified as to his hourly rate
and his opinion that the total fees were reasonable in this case
based upon his expertise as a practitioner in the area of family
law.

Marc's attorney, Ellen Maycock, made no objection to the

total amount of the fees, the reasonableness of the fees nor Mr.
Sheaffer's hourly rate.
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, Alicia should
be awarded her attorney's fees in the amount of $5,077.40.
Point V
ALICIA IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED THE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY HER IN
THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS APPEAL.
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Section 30-3-3(1), Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended), is
the statutory basis for an award of attorneys1 fees in divorce
actions.

It states that:
fl

...[I]n any action to establish an order of
custody, visitation, child support, alimony or
division of property in a domestic case, the
court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney's fees, and witness fees, including
expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend
the action. The order may include provisions
for costs of the action."
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's
fees incurred both at the trial and appellate levels. See Dahlberg
v. Dahlbera. 77 Utah 157, 292, P.214 (1930); Carter v. Carter, 584
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978); and Mauahan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 162 (Utah
App. 1989).
Clearly, the statute gives this Court the authority to
award Alicia her attorney's fees to allow her to "prosecute" the
appeal to a successful resolution in her favor.
This Court has also consistently held that a party to a
divorce action who is successful on an appeal is entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with
maintaining the appeal.

See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 839 (Utah

App. 1991).
CONCLUSION
Points I, II, III, IV and V of this Brief clearly
demonstrate

the

trial

court

committed

significant

errors in

granting Marc's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce
and requiring Alicia to remain in Summit County with the children
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or, if she should decide to move from Summit County, that physical
custody of the children would be transferred to Marc.

In so

ordering, the trial court gave Alicia no alternative other than to
appeal to this Court to correct the substantial inequities.
This Court should award Alicia all of her attorney's fees
and costs related to pursuing this appeal and the matter should be
remanded to the trial court for a determination of the same and
entry of an appropriate judgment against Marc.
The trial court erred in failing to award Alicia her
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending Marc's Petition to
Modify. The testimony was clear that Marc has sufficient income to
assist Alicia in paying her attorney's fees and, moreover, Alicia
has no income other than the money she receives as alimony and
child support.

Furthermore, this court should award Alicia her

fees and costs incurred in prosecuting artd maintaining this appeal.
DATED this ^

~ day of

\J (f"^-~

, 1994.

DART, ADAMSON &

Bv
''JOHN D. SHEAFFER ^JR./
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and
correct

copy

of the

foregoing

Brief of Appellant

delivered, to:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Ut£ft .84101

DATED this (TV ""day of

1994.

DART, ADAMSON & DONOV
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
ALICIA LARSON,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10958

V.

MARC S. LARSON,
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.
-oOo-

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on the 25th day of March, 1992, the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding, plaintiff appearing in person and by
and through her attorney, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., and defendant
appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Ellen Maycock;
and counsel for each party having previously met together with the
Court

in chambers

at the pre-trial

settlement

conference on

March 23, 1992, to advise the Court of the issues remaining to be
resolved, and thereafter all issues in dispute having been resolved
by

agreement

between

the

parties

involved

herein,

and

the

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement of the parties having
now been read into the record in the presence of plaintiff and

OOOOGo

BOOK umDiwmn

defendant., and

each party

having

confirmed

the

Stipulation

and

Property Settlement Agreement and acknowledged their agreement to
be bound by the terms thereof, and this Stipulation having been
accepted and approved by the Court, and defendant having consented
therein that his Answer and Counterclaim be withdrawn and his
default be entered, and the default of the defendant having been
entered, and the plaintiff having been sworn and examined on the
basis of her Complaint, and the Court being otherwise fully advised
and having made and entered its written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from

the defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, with
said Decree to become final upon signature and entry by the Court.
2.

Child Custody, Plaintiff and defendant are awarded

the joint legal custody of the parties1 three minor children, to
wit: BRANDI ANNE LARSON, b o m Mary 26, 1984; APRIL KRISTEN LARSON,
born July 20, 1985; and ANGIE MAYE LARSON, born October 14, 1987.
The plaintiff is awarded the primary physical care, custody and
control of the children, and the primary residence of the children
is designated with the plaintiff.

The defendant is awarded the

right to physical custody of the children during reasonable and
liberal times and places to include at least the following:
-approximately two and one-half weekends each month; extended summer
visits; one-half of Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day; alternating
other legal holidays; during the summer months when the children
2
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are not in school the visitation schedule should be adjusted

to

allow for weekday visits. Each party shall cooperate in fostering
and maintaining one another's relationship and parental role with
the children and each party shall inform one another of issues of
importance as they may arise in the children's lives so as to allow
the parties to jointly participate in making decisions concerning
the children's upbringing.

If the parties are unable to reach

agreement on any such issue, however, then they shall first attempt
resolution of the dispute through mediation before bringing the
issue to the Court for resolution.
Each party shall give the other party a minimum of
thirty (3 0) days advance written notice prior to relocating from
the Park City, Utah, area to allow the parties to participate in
mediation of any child custody issue prior to relocation.
3.

Child

Support.

The defendant shall pay child

support to the plaintiff in the sum of $800 per month per child for
a total amount of $2,400 per month, to continue as to each child
until the age of eighteen years and graduation from high school in
due course. As additional child support, the defendant is ordered
to pay one-half of any and all work-related day care expenses
incurred for the benefit of the parties1 minor children as a result
of any out-of-home employment earning plaintiff taxable income.
4.

Dependency Exemptions. Beginning with the 1992 tax

year, the defendant is awarded the right to claim the parties1 two
eldest children as dependents for federal and state income tax

3
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purposes, and the plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the
parties1 youngest child as a dependent for this purpose.
5.

Alimony.

The

defendant

shall

pay

alimony to

plaintiff in the sum of $3,000 per month beginning April 1, 1992,
and continuing thereafter each month for a period of five (5) years
until April 1, 1997, or until the death of either party, whichever
shall occur first, at which time defendant's alimony obligation
shall automatically terminate.
shall

not

be

subject

to

Defendant's alimony obligation

reduction

due

to

any

increase to

plaintiff's income during the five year duration of the award, nor
shall the award of alimony terminate by reason of plaintiff's
remarriage within said period of duration.
6.

Health Insurance. The defendant shall maintain his

present policy of health, accident and hospitalization insurance
for the benefit of the parties' minor children or a policy having
equivalent coverage and benefits for the minor children.

The

plaintiff shall be responsible for all uninsured, routine medical
and dental expenses. Each party shall be responsible for one-half
of any and all other uninsured and deductible medical, dental
orthodontic, optical and psychotherapeutic and other such expenses
incurred for the benefit of the parties' minor children.
7.

Life Insurance.

Defendant shall maintain in full

force and effect a policy of life insurance on his life having a
benefit payable on death in the minimum sum of $300,000 naming the
parties' minor children as exclusive primary beneficiaries, with
the plaintiff to be designated as trustee.
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Effects.

-

Household

Furniture,

Furnishings

and

pftrRnnAi

During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired

certain items of household furniture and furnishings, personal
effects and belongings which are hereby awarded between the parties
as divided, with the plaintiff awarded all such items in her
possession, and the defendant awarded all such items in his
possession.
9.

Vehicles.

The plaintiff is awarded the Plymouth

Voyager Van as her separate property subject to the debt owing
thereon to Zions First National Bank, which she shall assume, pay
and hold defendant harmless therefrom.

The defendant is awarded

the Kawasaki motorcycle as his separate property.
10.

Real Property.

The parties1

interests in real

property is hereby equitably distributed as follows:
a.

Home.

The home and real property located in

Summit County, State of Utah, commonly known as 1286 Moray Court in
Park City, Utah, is awarded to the plaintiff as her sole and
separate property free and clear of any interest of the defendant,
subject to the mortgages owing to Capital City Bank and to Barney
and Evelyn Saunders, which she shall assume, pay and hold defendant
harmless therefrom.
b.

Condominium. The condominium commonlv known =»-

No. 8, Windrift Condominium, located in Park C
to the defendant as his sole and separate pro;
of

any

interest

of

the

plaintiff, subjec
cain
5
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obligation owing thereon to Draper Bank, which defendant snail

assume, pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom.
11.

IRA Accounts. The IRA account(s) maintained in the

Franklin US Government Securities Fund are hereby divided equally
between the parties.
12.

Summit Sports Medicine.

During the marriage, the

defendant established his physical therapy practice now known as
Summit Sports Medicine.

The defendant is awarded all assets of

Summit Sports Medicine, including equipment, receivables and the
vehicle associated with Summit Sports Medicine, as his separate
property, together with all liabilities associated therewith,
including the taxes, accounts payable and Vail Medical Center and
Fitness

Center

notes

payable,

which

shall

be

defendant's

responsibilities and he shall assume, pay and hold plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
13.

Crystal Images. The plaintiff is awarded all assets

of her Crystal Images art operation, including equipment, supplies
and inventory as her separate property subject to any liabilities
and obligations incurred through Crystal Images, which plaintiff
shall assume, pay and hold defendant harmless therefrom.
14.

ITT Life Insurance.

During the marriage, the

parties accumulated a cash surrender value in an ITT life insurance
policy of at least $3,500, which shall be immediately surrendered
and distributed to the plaintiff as her sole and separate property.
15.

Checking and Savings Accounts. During the course of

the parties1 marriage, the parties accumulated funds in certain
6
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checking and savings accounts maintained in her separate name as
her sole and separate property, and the defendant is awarded the
checking and savings accounts maintained in his separate name and
in the name of his business as his sole and separate property.
16.

Property Settlement, Plaintiff is awarded judgment

in her favor and against defendant in the principal sum of $86,500
to earn interest at the rate of 4% per annum from April 1, 1992,
until April 1, 1997, at which time this judgment shall be due and
payable to plaintiff and shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per
annum until fully paid and satisfied.

This property settlement

award and judgment shall be appropriately secured by defendant's
Summit Sports Medicine assets, accounts, accounts receivable,
equipment

and

vehicle,

and

the

security

interest

shall

be

appropriately perfected. This security interest is subordinate to
any necessary extension of credit to defendant and Summit Sports
Medicine for business purposes*
17.

Debts. The parties1 debts and obligations shall be

distributed and paid as follows:
a.

Plaintifffs Debts. The plaintiff shall assume,

pay and hold defendant harmless from the home mortgages owing to
Capital City Bank and the Saunders, the automobile loan owing to
Zions First National Bank for the Plymouth van and any debts and
obligations associated with Crystal Images.
b.

Defendant's Debts. The defendant shall assume,

pay and hold plaintiff harmless from the following debts and
7
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Obligations:

the amount

owing

to First

Interstate

B a n * on tne

line

of credit extended for the purpose of plaintiff's attorneys' fees
retainer and costs, the automobile loan owing to Zions First
National

Bank

for defendant's daughter's automobile, and the

automobile loan owing to Larry Miller and any and all debts and
obligations associated with defendant's Summit Sports Medicine
practice.
18.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Each party shall assume

and pay their own attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein.
19.

Mutual Cooperation. Each party shall cooperate with

the other, through counsel or otherwise, to effect changes in
titles to property agreed to be divided hereunder, to change the
names of responsible parties for payment upon the charge accounts
and other debts divided herein, and to cooperate in each and every
other way necessary or proper to insure that the orders of the
Court entered are carried out in every detail.
DATED this

2~ 7

day of

^^/fr-^-w^ , 1992.

BY THE COURT:

HOMER F. WILKINSON
District Court Judge
APPROVED:
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK

By.

/ .
i/~ V/ / v ^ ELLEd*'' MAYCOCK
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the >( '

day

of April, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of
Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
/

IRENE M. CLARK

000973

A'^

Kim Peterson, MSW

'.O. EG* 18747
alt Lake City, Utah 84118
J01) 965-9511 7588-3578

V

Licensed Clinical Social Wot

CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION

RECEIVED

(Confidential)

JAN 1 3 1993
baa. Adamson &

Plaintiff:

Alicia Larson

Defendant:

Marc Larson

Case Number:

10958, Summit county

Date:

12-26-92

UMT/i

The plaintiff, Alicia Larson, is a 39-year-old Caucasian
female who lives in Park City, Utah. The defendant, Marc Laxson,
is a 41-year-old Caucasian male who also lives in Park City.
Alicia and Marc were married August 27, 1983 and were
divorced April, 1992. They have three children, Brandi, age 8
(DOB: 5-20-84), April age 7 (DCS: 7-26-85), and Angie, aye 5
(DOB: 10-14-86). Alicia and Mark share legal joint custody with
her home having been designated as the children's primary
residence. Alicia is currently planning on remarriage and
relocating in Corvalis, Oregon, and Marc has filed for full
custody of the children.
XX

Plaintiff:

Alicia Larson is the youngest of two
children. She was raised "everywhere," as
her father was in the military. Her parents had a stagnant
marriage, but Alicia reported a good relationship with both
parents and a happy childhood. She was an above-average student
and has attended one year of college.
Alicia denied any history of psychiatric disturbance, she
denied any alcohol abuse, but during her early twenties, she
occasionally used marijuana and cocaine. She has never been
arrested.
Alicia married her first husband, Gene wingate, when age 19
He was physically
He was considerably older and a rock musician
lifestyle
and left
abusive, and she became disenchanted with his
after about one year. She was single for the next ten years, but
during her mid-twenties, she lived with a roan for approximately
two years.
Marc was Alicia's physical therapist, and she was attracted
to him because ho was helpful, caring, and funny, and "I thought
he was like that all the time." However, after they married, she
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found him to be entirely different at home. He did not
communicate and was unaffectionate. Ke normally worked until
7:00 to 8:00 p.m., and when he came home, he would do charting or
eat dinner while he watched TV. Marc had his life, and she and
the girls had their lives, and she found her marriage to be very
lonely. Alicia said it was almost impossible to engage Marc in
any meaningful conversation. They saw numerous marital
therapists, and Alicia did everything she could to improve their
relationship. However, nothing had any lasting effect, and their
relationship continued to deteriorate. Alicia said she often
made plans to leave, but she stayed, as she did not want to admit
failure. She said it was like "living with a dead person," and
she finally ran out of things to distract herself, and eventually
she found the courage to leave.
Alicia indicated Marc loves the children, and when home from
work, he would often become quite involved with the children.
However, she usually had to ask Marc to help with the children,
and he refused to have his sleep interrupted. Alicia felt Marc
usually had his head buried in the sand, and he would be unaware
if the children had symptoms of illness, and his typical response
was "they'll be fine." If the children misbehaved, he would
simply "tune it out," and he did not become involved in
discipline. His relationship with the children has been "fun,"
but he has not been very close to them, and his older daughter
from a previous marriage has said, "you can't really talk to my
dad." Since the separation and divorce, Marc has maintained
regular visitation, he has become more attentive when he has the
Liiiiuitsn,
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before, like helping them with school work.
In contrast, Alicia saw herself as being a "great" parent.
She felt she has alv/ays provided excellent care, and she has been
tuned in to the children's emotional and developmental needs.
She has found parenting to be a very enjoyable experience, and
she is able to really talk to the children and treats them as
human beings. The children have been her first priority, she has
given them a lot of attention, and she spends quality time with
them. She has spent a lot of time helping the children with
their intellectual development, and she usually helps them with
school work. Alicia felt she was very aware of any problems the
children are having, and she felt she did a good job with
discipline and guidance. At times, she will yell at the
children, but for the most part, she remains calm. Alicia felt
the children had alv/ays been more closely bonded to her.
Defendant:

Marc Larson was raised in Grand Junction,
Colorado. He is the second of five children.
He reported a close relationship with his mother, but he was not
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very close to his father, as he was deaf, and it was difficult to
communicate with him. As a child, Marc was introverted and a
home body, but he was a good student and became involved in extra
curricular activities. Marc is a college graduate.
Marc denied any specific psychiatric difficulties, but when
he went on a mission for the LDS Church, he had difficulty
adjusting to being away from home. During the marriage to
Alicia, they saw numerous marital therapists. Marc denied any
problems with substance abuse or difficulty with the lav/.
Marc married his first wife, Pain, when age 21. They
divorced after five years due to incompatibility, and she wanted
out. They have two children, Laurie, age IS, and Matthew, age
16, who haveslived with their mother since the time of the
divorce.
Three years after his divorce, Marc married Alicia after a
courtship lasting approximately six months. He found her to be
attractive and intelligent, but they began having problems
shortly after they got married. There were numerous stressors,
and Alicia was unhappy with the long hours required by his
business. They had difficulty communicating, and "the more she
knew about me, the less she liked." They grew apart emotionally
and sexually, and they had different interests. There was a lot
of conflict over the way Alicia treated his older children, and
there was a lot of stress from having Alicia's younger stepbrother, who had a lot of behavior problems, living with them.
Later there was also conflict over how they should raise their
three children. Another area of conflict was religion, as Alicia
was not as devout as he was. When they disagreed, Alicia would
become overly assertive and would attack him and become verbally
abusive, and he would withdraw, which made him feel even more
lonely, and "it was an ugly and vicious cycle." Alicia had been
talking about divorce for two to three years prior to the
separation, and their relationship during that time had been more
like roommates.
Overall, Marc saw Alicia as being a good parent. She meets
the children's basic needs, is loving, and spends quality time
with the children. However, she has had numerous weaknesses.
She was a poor housekeeper, and even though she did not work, at
times, she required the services of a maid and a nanny, and she
began putting the children in child care when they "were quite
young. Marc said when he returned home from work, Alicia "would
have had it* with the children, and she has a history of becoming
irritable and yelling at the children. Marc complained that
after the separation, Alicia turned away from LDS values, and she
began using alcohol and having men spend the night, which has
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been confusing to the children. She has used the children by
threatening to take them away from him, and since announcing her
plans to move to Oregon, she has tried to brainwash the children
against him.
Marc saw himself as being a good parent. He said he really
enjoys playing with the children and doing things with them, but
"I just wish I had more time." In spite of a demanding work
schedule, Marc said he has always been involved in child rearing
when at home. Marc said he has not had outside interests, and
"when not at work, he has been at home. Marc said he has always
played with the children and takes them on activities, and he has
put a lot of effort into teaching the children about values and
their religion. Marc felt he did a good job with discipline, and
he sticks tovlimits when they are set. He uses time-out and has
rarely used corporal punishment. Since the separation, Marc said
he has tried very hard not to be a Disneyland daddy, and he has
established rules, chores, and responsibilities in his home. He
felt he and the children have a close bond. He felt April was
more closely bonded to him, but Angie and Brandi are somewhat
more bonded to their mother.

?1aintiff:

After separating, April, 1391, Alicia stayed
in the family home with the children.
Because of the larger house payment, she moved to a smaller
three-bedroom home, which she rents, approximately four months
ago. Alicia has been receiving $5,400 per month in alimony and
child support, and in addition, she has been self-employed as a
stained glass artist and has produced three books. Her selfemployment income is approximately $10,000 per year.
Alicia said her lifestyle has centered around the children
and getting her life back on track. Alicia said she was no
longer active in the LDS Church, but she isn't against it, and
she takes the children. She indicated that she planned to expose
the children to different religions and give them a choice.
Since June, IS32, she has been dating Doug Pomeroy, age 40, and
they plan on getting married in January, 1393. Doug is also a
g-iass artist. He lives in Corvalis, Oregon, and Alicia plans on
moving there right after the first of the year. She denied
wanting to move to cut Marc out of the children's lives. She
said, though, that she has been uncomfortable living in Park
City, as Marc is prominent, and "I am that woman.* In contrast,
Doug is well-established in Corvalis, and she felt it made more
sense for her to move to Corvalis. At first, the children were
apprehensive about moving, but they have come to accept the idea.
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Doug reported growing up in Lake Chelan, Washington. He is
the youngest of four children. Doug reported a good relationship
with his parents and a happy childhood. He was an average
student and has attended one year of college. Doug was
previously married for a period of nine years. His wife died of
Hodgkinfs disease in 1991. They did not have any children. Doug
has been self-employed as a stained glass artist for the past
twelve years and earns approximately $15,000 per year. He owns a
four-bedroom home, and his studio is located next to his home.
Doug denied any history of psychiatric problems or alcohol abuse.
He admitted to occasional recreational use of marijuana prior to
15 years ago. In 1974, he was arrested for possession of
marijuana and was given a fine of $100.00.
Alicia and Doug felt their relationship "was going well.
They have similar interests, and Alicia described him as being a
good communicator. Doug felt he was developing a good
relationship with Alicia's children. He said he was a little
nervous about having children, but he was looking forward to the
challenge.
Alicia felt she had been very liberal with visitation,
especially during this past summer. After this current school
year began, weekday visits were too disruptive, as the children
weren't getting homework done. The schedule was changed so that
Hark now has the children 2 1/2 weekends per month. Alicia said
Marc has been pushing for more and more time with the children,
and she saw some of his tactics as quite manipulative, for
example, having the children call her to ask for more time.
Alicia said she has been stressing the need for structure, and
she denied any intention of wanting to hurt Marc or take the
children from him, and she felt it was possible for Marc to spend
extensive time with the-children even with her out of state.
Alicia did not feel Marc really wants custody. She felt his
real motive was to keep her from leaving the state. Alicia said
she has offered Marc very lenient visitation, primarily during
the summer months, but this has been unacceptable to Marc, and it
would require him to use a day care provider, and he does not
believe in day care. Instead, Marc is asking for the majority of
his visitation during the school year, and he does not seem to be
aware of how disruptive it would be for the children to attend
two different schools each year.
Alicia felt she should retain physical custody, as she has
been the primary care giver, and she believed the children were
more closely bonded to her. She also felt she was the better
parent, as she is more aware of the children's needs, and when
there is a problem, she handles it rather than ignoring it like
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Hare. By getting married, she felt she would also create more of
a family atmosphere for the children. She felt she should be
allowed to move with the children, as she was creating a better
life for them, and she felt the children, in the long run, would
adjust better by not having to go back and forth between the two
homes as frequently as they do now.
Defendant:

Marc reported that after separating, he
rented a condominium, and approximately one
year ago, he bought a three-bedroom condominium. He currently
has his brother and his wife and three children living with him
on a temporary basis while their home is being built. They plan
on moving shortly after the first of the year. They are
obviously cramped at this point, and when the children visit,
they sleep wLth Marc.
Marc has been self-employed since 1982 as a physical
therapist. Kis business, Summit Sports Medicine, has offices in
Salt Lake City and Park City, and his yearly income is $120,000.
Marc said that at the time of the divorce, Alicia
reluctantly agreed to joint legal custody. Marc said at the time
he knew it wasn't reasonable for him to have, physical custody
because of his work schedule, and he agreed to a very generous
financial settlement based on the belief that Alicia wouldn't
work, would stay home with the children, and would remain in the
family home. However, she chose to disrupt the children by
working and by moving the children from their home, and she now
plans on further disrupting their lives by moving again and
separating the children from their father. In addition, she no
longer follows the standards of the LDS Church, which has been
confusing to the children.
Marc said that after the separation, he had liberal
visitation "with the children, but since the beginning of the
current school year, Alicia has been controlling about any
visitation outside of the set schedule. He no longer takes the
children during the week, but has the children an extra weekend
day once a month. He has also been going.to the children's
school to have lunch with them once a week.
Marc's lifestyle centers around work and the children. In
addition, he is active in the LDS Church. He has not dated for
some time and currently has no social life, but he often sees
members of his extended family. Marc said he feels depressed and
lonely when the children are not with him. He was very sure that
one day he would remarry.
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Marc said Alicia notified him of her intention to move
toward the end of October, 1332. Alicia was planning on moving
in three weeks, and he decided to seek custody. Initially, they
tried to work things out through a mediator, but this option
failed. Marc said he did not want to take the children from
Alicia, and what he would like is joint legal and physical
custody. Alicia has proposed that he have visitation six weeks
each summer, plus one to two weekends per month with extra time
for holidays. Marc felt this arrangement was unacceptable, as he
wants longer blocks of time with the children where he can be
more involved in parenting. Marc has proposed that he have the
children 5 1/2 months each year, January through June, and that
during that time, Alicia could have the children one week in
February for President's Day vacation, and one week in April for
Spring breaks plus one to two weekends per month.
Marc said that with his plan, the children wouldn't require
any more child care than they currently have, and he would be
able to work fewer hours during the time the children were with
him. He said he has talked to school officials, and even though
they did not see the situation as being ideal, they saw the plan
as workable, and they have expressed a willingness to work with
the school district in Corvalis. Marc said the children have
experienced a lot of anxiety about moving, and Brandi's school
counselor has said this was not a good time for her to move.
Marc wondered why it was so important for Alicia to leave Utah
and why Doug was not willing to move to Utah.
Marc felt he should be granted joint legal and physical
custody of the children, as the children need him, too. Ke said
he wanted to be a parent to his children and not just a weekend
father, and he felt he had much to offer them. Ke felt he could
provide more stability and continuity for the children, and Marc
saw himself as being more family oriented than Alicia, and he has
extended family in Utah. He also stressed that he would raise
the children in the LDS Church, whereas, he felt Alicia's
lifestyle would confuse the children.
IV.

CHILDREN

(To be kept strictly confidential from parents)

The children were first interviewed at their mother's home
on 12-16-32.
Brandi reported feeling bad about her parents being
divorced, and the worst part is not being atrle to live with both.
Living with her mother has been "great.n She also likes to see
her father. She felt she saw her father often enough, as "I
already see him lots."
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Branoi reported a good r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h both p a r e n t s , and
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Brandi said she didn't know how she zeit about her mother
moving to Oregon, but she felt happy that her mother was getting
married, and because she's getting married, she should move. Sh
denied being pressured by her mother to move to Oregon, nor has
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Sue

liked

it at both homes .

Both

parents

play with her, and her father takes her skiing, and her rrtcther
takes her sleigh riding. Both parents expect her to help clean
the house, cxndi for punishment, both spank her and send her to her
room. Angie ielt her parents were equally likely to spend time
with her, and she gets along with them equally well. She
reported feeling as happy in one home as the other, and she
reported feeling equally close to her parents.
good relationship with Doug and
happy about her mother marrying Doug and moving to Oregon.
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parent's custody battle. Prior to this incident and afterward,
she seemed to be fine. Mo problems were observed in the other
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Erin Haucjli, one of-. Har'c's employees, said Hare ha^ a heart
•r f gold and i s very people oriented. He handles stress well, anc
ne has never :~, e^mt
Mart is a very ambitious parent. He is very concerned about
how the children look, and he goes the extra miie to make sure
they are well c.-iied Lorr and in contrast to Alicia, he seems more
c o n s c i e n t \ o i\ c ,
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example, when Alicia has the children, their socks don't alwa]
match, and their clothes would be inside oui
aiso tdiKeu dijout theii" mother giving their: :
lor breakfast. During the marriage, it always seemed like he
parenting, and he seemed to do a
with the children. When Marc has the children, he expects them
to mind, and they show him respect and have a close reiationshi;
witii m m .
Hare udS a lot of patience, and he has seemed more

Al i c i a "was seen as di f f i cul t to get to know. She wou 1 d
sometimes be very pleasant, and other days, she would ignore
Erin. The house was always a mess, and once April said her
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;hiiclren to run wild and bother Marc's patients, and she would
to control them, leaving that up to Hare's
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i cnore t hem .
Cathy ?envore , a f r i end of Ilar c •' s , descr i bed h i m
wonderful person wno everyj
a nd h e cares dee p1y abou t his c h i1d r e n.
t h e m o s t i m porta n t t h1n <
He treats the children very well, and if he has to
discipline them, he does it with kindness. During the marriage,
he seemed very involved in child care,
at work,
He has been good about spending ouality time with th*
and they have a close relationship with him.
Cathy said she also likes Alicia, but she isn't a warm
person like Marc. She is bright and talented, and when she set:
her mind to do something, she will do it. The play to move awa'j
was felt to be selfish, and at the time of the divorce, she
seemed vindictive. At the time, she told Cathy that if Hare
didn't give her what she wanted, he was going to need a passpor*
to see the children. During the marriage, Alicia always seemed
to be a good parent, and the children have always oeen very cior
to her. In comparison to Marc, Alicia is more, rigid, and sue he
Therefore, '*z was suspected that
she wou1d have more trouble than Hare handling the children whei
they reached aoolescence.
Sheri Wright, a friend of Alicia's, uescribed her as car in*.
and honest, and she has been very involved in community
At one point, she spearheaded a community drive to get sidewalk
and bike paths in for the sake of the children's safety.
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great pdreut.
On the children and iS aware of their

Sue i^ very

needs,

iie Cicing ano what is going on in their lives, and she takes th<
time to listen and 1 earn. She is conscicutious and concerned aj
has always provided good care. She plays with her children
frequently, and she has been involved with them in girl scouts.
She recognizes the importance of structure, consistency, and a
legular schedule, and she does a good job with discipline and
guidance. She teaches the children responsibility and gives th«
choices. She helps them with school work. She isn't too stric
or too lenient
Marc was seen as genuine and unselfish, and a wonderful mai
He is very honest, and he is not a malicious person. However, 1
p i a y t n e v i c 11 rn r o 1 e .
but he is a w o r k a h o l i c . Sheri said that at one time she iiV'
w i t h M a r c and A l i c i a , and her work s c h e d u l e w a s u s u a l l y from
6:00 a.m. Uut i i 7:30 to 3:00 p . iii. at n i g*ht. W h e n he w a s at

he watched a lot of a TV, and he left the majority of child
rearing up to Alicia. He has had a tendency to forget to fo
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•Ancomf o r t ab1e 11ving in ?ark City since the divorce, because of
gossip. She has wanted to leave since the time they separated.
but she has stayed because of the children'
Marc.
Betty Kowa1syk, Brandi's schoo1 psycho 1og i st i
Alicia perceive things very differently, ano ^
.oren, ano especially Brandi, seem
a 1 ot of pres:
:he chl iciren. Ovi^ was not seen as being more guilty than
, 1her . Brandi has been hav i ng ao jus tmenn proo i ems , ano sn•
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response was that he just wanted to knov* i f
out.
He was, told yes, but he was also told there "would be majoi
problems in trying to work out such a schedule.
a friend of'Alicia's, described her as
extremeiy orignt creative, responsible, and she has a lot oi
energy. She deals with reality very well, and there is no
indication of psychological problems.
Alicia was felt to be a good parent. She provides good ca:
and is very at tent i ve. If the ch i1dren need someth i ng, Alicia
will drop what she is doing to attend to their
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struct u r e a n d 1i m its »«h i c h t h ey n e e d
anci they are very close
seem to JJe wei i adjusted.
Sherry Baltz, a former neighbor, saw Marc as being solid and
oepenoabie, ano ne has always been an attentive parent.
Sherry
.._

_

i

Ale :

marriage, but he has always done things
has been committed to his family. The c m 1dren are all very
loving ano ciose to Hare, and when he has them, he seems to take
very good care of them. He does a good job of disciplining, and
the children mind him well. He has not been the type of parent
vjho i gnor es prob 1 ems, and when he deals w 11h m i sbehav i or , he dce s
it in a pos i t i ve manner.
Alicia's heart is in the right place, but her style is more
f 1 a mb oy a n t wh en she does t h i ng s w i t h the children, wh er e a s Mar c
just does quality things with the children without the fanfare.
In comparison to Marc, she does not seem to be as stable. Sue is
more focused on herself, and she tends to be aloof and in her ovrn
Her persoudl life has more ups dud dovjn^ bince ^he ano
Marc separateo, ano sue nas ueen iess responsiuie. ror example,
Sherry said her daughter tended for Alicia in the past, and she
had a hard time getting home at the appoii
Jeff Larson, Marc's brother, said he was unsure of Alicia's
current parenting, but in the past, she was a gooo and caring
parent. However, she tends to be self-centered, and she
overreacts and yells at the children when upset. Since the
separation, she has stopped going to church, and seems to no
longer provide religious training, and it appears as though she
has relied a lot upon others to provide child care. It also
appears as though she has been using the children as a weapon
against iiarc, and she has been controlling about the children's
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P a r e n t inappropriately p i e b s u r i n y t h e c h i l d r e n , bill
r esponded
s e n s i t i v e and want to p l e a s e b o t h p a r e n t s .
to bUCjciestions, a n d b h e h a s d o n e
c h i l d r e n to e x p r e s s their f e e l i n g s . S h e is s e n s i t i v e to t h e
ch i 1 or en ' s needs , i nc I ud i ng t h e i m p o r tanc e of t h e m in a 1 n t a i n i no
their r e1 a 11on ship with their f a t h e r .
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R e c e n 1 1 y A l l c i a a n n o u n c e d that s h e p1 ai
d e l a y i n g h e r m o v e t o O r e g o n until June
year e n d s .
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Marc nas been an excellent provider, and he has recognized
potential custodial parent due to the
However, Marc has good basic parenting
Lilt?
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and meet t h e c h i l d r e n i i e e d b .
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that

r Marc's desire for
custody is of short duration, and he seems more
concerned about having frequent contact with the children rather
than actually wanting custody. His custody suit is viewed as
more of an attempt to prevent Alicia from moving from the area.
However, if he is not able to accomplish this goal, he is very
sensitive in his desire to have joint physical custody, as he is
v e ry interest ed i n ma i nt a i n i ng a ina j or ro 1 e i n the ch 11 dr enf s
1i ves .

B o t h A l i c i a a n d Marc a r e felt t o b e c a p a b l e of r a i s i n g t u e
c h i l d r e n a n d h a v i n g physical c u s t o d y . B o t h v/i 11 r e q u i r e
v.r,+. ; j. ^^ n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r w h i c h parenl
surrogate care, out
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about Alicia's lifestyle, given her and Marc's LD3 background.
Their previous joint commitment to their religious ideas and
values implies an understanding rhat the children would be raise
with the same values and ideals, and Alicia's change of lifestyl
is potentially confusing to the children. Obviously, Marc's
religious beliefs and lifestyle is more compatible with the way
Idren have be«
1ive in Utah,
ildren to maintain their relationships.
However, on the other hand, Alicia offers the children the
advantage of a two-parent household.
The children have a good relationship with both parents
is assumed that since they have been living v/ith their mothe:
that they would-be more closely bonded to her. However, bas*;
the children's report, if they are more closely
minimal. The children have struggled v/ith
the idea of moving to Oregon, and at this point, they seem to
accept the idea that they will be living there with their mother
has been the primary care giver, has had
physical custody and has done a reasonably good job in these
uoles, I do not believe there is sufficient reason to chanae
cu^ tody
Ideally, Alicia wou1d remain in the State of Ut,
the children to maintain frequent contact v/ith their
to reconsider her move and to explore the
possibility of having her fiance move to Utah. However, I
recognize the complexities of modern life and understand that
th i s may not be poss i b1e.
If Alicia follows through with her planned move to Orego:
physical custody should be contingent upon: I)
not living together without the benefit of marriage, and
chi1dren bei ng ra i sed i n the LDS re 1i g i on.
Marc should be granted liberal visitation so long as
not interfere with the children's scuooiinc.
circumstances should the children transfer to the Park City
School D.istr'ict for part of the school year to accommodate Marc
visitation. Hare should have visitation a minimum of six to
e i g ht we e k s each s umm e r a n d
vacation, to begin one year at the start oi Curistmas vacaiion.
and on alternate years on December 26. In addition, Marc shoulu
be granted visitation for the duration ot ^3.a\ Spring oreari.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALICIA LARSON,
Plaintiff,

;
;)

vs.

]

MARC LARSON,

;)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 10958
Judge David S. Young

]

Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial
on April 15, 1993, the Honorable David S. Young presiding.

Plaintiff was present and

represented by her counsel, John Sheaffer, and defendant was present and represented by his
counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court heard the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and
heard arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, the court hereby
makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
1.

The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on April 29, 1992.

2.

The decree provided that plaintiff and defendant would have joint legal custody of

heir three minor children, Brandy, April, and Angie. Plaintiff was awarded primary physical

0'J021o
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custody and defendant was awarded nehts of visitation. The decree further provided that each
party would cooperate in fostering and maintaining the other party's relationship and parental
role with the children and that the parties would jointly participate in making decisions
concerning the children's upbringing.
3.

In October of 1992, plaintiff informed defendant that she intended to move, with

the three children, to Corvalis, Oregon.
4.

Plaintiff has been the primary caregiver for the parties' minor children, but

defendant has had a significant, active, open involvement in their lives. Defendant has fulfilled a
traditional role in the children's lives; that is, he is the bread winner, and plaintiff has been the
person designated to raise the children.
5.

Notwithstanding that plaintiff has been the primary caregiver, the children are

nearly equally bonded to both parents. Defendant is extremely committed to his children and
wishes to continue to be involved in their lives.
6.

Plaintiff and defendant are each excellent parents. Each is equally capable of

caring for the children.
7.

At best, it is speculative whether a move to Corvalis, Oregon would be successful

or permanent. In the summer of 1992, plaintiff met Douglas Pomeroy, who lives in Corvalis,
Oregon, and plaintiff indicated that she and Mr. Pomeroy intend to marry.

However, Mr.

Pomeroy and plaintiff have not yet married and there is a potential for conflict if the family were
to move in with Mr. Pomeroy. Nothing about the move to Corvalis, Oregon would enhance the
children's educational environment, nor plaintiffs career potential. It is a high risk move for
plaintiff and the children.
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8.

Defendant has exercised all visitation that has been allowed by plaintiff and has

sought additional visitation. He has been involved in the children's school and has been an
attentive, caring parent.
9.

The children do not wish to move to Corvalis, Oregon.

10.

Although the custody evaluator, Kim Peterson, recommended that the children

remain in the physical custody of plaintiff, he indicated in his report that it would be in the
children's best interests to remain in Utah and reading his report as a whole, it is clear that the
recommendation was a close call. The present custodial arrangements have fostered happy welladjusted lives for the children.
11.

Although there are no defects in plaintiffs capacity or willingness to function as a

parent, there is some question about plaintiffs stability because of her several changes of
residence during the year since the entry of the decree of divorce herein.
12.

Both parents have an equal depth of and long term desire for custody. The father

has shown a commitment to the children.
13.

Defendant would provide personal care for the children by reducing the hours that

he works and would also be required to provide some surrogate care.
14.

During the marriage, both parents and the children attended the LDS Church and

were active in the LDS Church. Since the separation of the parties, plaintiff has ceased to be
active in the LDS Church. Defendant remains active and wishes to keep the children active in
the LDS Church. The court finds that it is unlikely that, if the children were to move to Corvalis,
Oregon, plaintiff would continue their religious training.
15.

The majority of the children's extended family, including aunts, uncles, and

cousins, are primarily in the state of Utah. Defendant's children from his prior marriage, halfsister and half-brother to these children, also live in Utah. These children have an excellent
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relationships with their older half-sister and half-brother.

They lave many friends and

connections in Utah.
16.

A move to Corvalis, Oregon is not in the children's best interests; it is in the best

interests of the children to remain in Summit County, Utah. If plaintiff wishes to continue to
reside in Summit County, the children will remain primarily in her physical custody.

If,

however, plaintiff determines to move to Corvalis, Oregon, primary physical custody of the
children should be transferred to defendant and plaintiff should have liberal visitation.
17.

Plaintiff did not keep defendant informed of the development of her plans to

move, or has not kept defendant fully advised of the children's activities in school. Each party
should be admonished to keep the other fully informed about the children's activities and welfare.
48.

Plaintiff has not shown a need for assistance with payment of her attorney's fees.

Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court makes and enters the following:
Conclusions of Law
1.

The petition for modification of the decree of divorce should be granted. The

parties should maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff determines to
reside in Summit County, Utah, she should retain primary physical custody of the children and
defendant's visitation shall remain as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff
decides to move from Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children should be
transferred to defendant, and plaintiff should have reasonable and liberal visitation.
2.

Each party should bear his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein.
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DATED this _J£day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, on the ^ d a y of
June, 1993:
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq.
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167

^2

\J

r

<J *Jf ^

C4\r~

^&£.*&lst*0^

JL

k-•?»*>

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KJRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Defendant
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALICIA LARSON,
Plaintiff,

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
MARC LARSON,

Civil No. 10958
Judge David S. Young

Defendant.

Defendant's petition for modification of decree of divorce came before the court for trial
on April 15, 1993, pursuant to notice. The Honorable David S. Young presided. Plaintiff was
present and represented by her counsel, John D. Sheaffer, Jr., and defendant was present and
represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock. The court having heard the testimony of witnesses,
received exhibits, heard arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
as follows:

BOQffppwir 00-7
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1.

Defendant's petition for modification of the decree of divorce is granted. The

parties shall maintain joint legal custody of their minor children. If plaintiff resides in Summit
County, Utah, she shall retain primary physical custody of the children and defendant's visitation
shall continue as set forth in the decree of divorce. In the event plaintiff decides to move from
Summit County, Utah, physical custody of the children shall be transferred to defendant, and
plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable and liberal visitation.
2.

Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney's fees and costs herein.

DATED this / j £ d ^ of ^vJ^^

, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, on t h e ^ f day of
June, 1993:
John D. Sheaffer, Jr., Esq.
Dart, Adamson & Donovan
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2167
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JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930)
DART, ADAMSON St DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-216"7
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

FILED"
JUL 12 1933
Clerk of Summit County
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
ALICIA LARSON

OBJECTION TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 10958
MARC LARSON,
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
oOo
COMES

NOW

the

plaintiff,

Alicia

Larson,

and

hereby

objects to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by
plaintiff in the above-entitled action resulting from trial before
the Court on April 15, 1993 as follows for the reasons hereinbelow
stated:
1.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed

by defendant fail to incorporate the Court's specific findings that
the

relationship

between

the

plaintiff

and

her

fiancee

are

irrelevant to the best interests of the children unless it enhances
the relationship with the defendant, and the Court does not so

ft~fcU>

find.

See Transcript of Ruling

(hereinafter

"Transcript") at

page 5, lines 10-13, a copy of which is attached hereto.
2,

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed

by defendant fail to incorporate

the Court's specific findings

that there is no defect in plaintiff's moral character or emotional
stability.

See Transcript at page 6, lines 6-11.
3.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed

by defendant fail to incorporate the Court's specific finding that
plaintiff will likely decline to move to Corvallis, Oregon, based
on her testimony.

See Transcript at page 8, lines 20-25.

DATED this

/ V ^ day of July, 1993.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

/^/JOHN D. SHEAFFER,~ ^PL / 6>
Attorneys for Plaintiff

jvsn

/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

qdx day

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the M ^"^

of July, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection
to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was faxed and
mailed to:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

IRENE M. CLATRK
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FILE NO.

TITLE:

(• Parties Present)

10958

COUNSEL:
(• Counsel
' JOHN D. SHEAFFER. JR.
310 SOUTH MAIN ST, STE 1330
•: SALT LAKE CITY. UT 84101-2167

ALICIA LARSON
VS
MARC LARSON

Present)

." ELLEN MAYCOCK
. 8TH FL, VALLEY TOWER
. 50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
•

JOYE D. OVARD
CLERK
ED MIDGLEY

H QN.

DAVID S. YOUNG

REPORTER
TODD HIXSON

JUDGE
DATE

.

JULY 15, 1993

BAILIFF
COURT'S RULING:
The Court being fully advised in the premises hereby denies Plaintiff's Objections
and enters Defendant's Order this 15th day of July 1993.

COPIES MAILED TO COUNSEL 8-25-93 .JO

£>,-^"V

PAGE

OF

m

JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (293 0)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

i * 1993

Dart, Adamson & Donovan

No.

FILED
AUG 2 4 1993
Clerk of Summit County
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT By
Deputy CWk
I N AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

oOo

ALICIA LARSON
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

MARC LARSON,

Civil

No.

10958

Defendant.
oOo
COMES

NOW

the plaintiff, Alicia

Larson,

and

by

and

through her attorney undersigned hereby appeals to the Utah Court
of Appeals the decision and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce
entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit
County,

State

of

Utah,

on July

26, 1993, and

further

hereby

provides notice of the filing of a cash bond in the sum of $300.00
with the clerk of the above-entitled Court to insure payment of
costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

,
DATED this

?Ji ^-day of August, 1993.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

O

By /l/C^/ / J O H N D~ SHEAFFER, # R / f
i/

Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant

ft-AO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the

ZM—day

of August, 1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of
Appeal was hand-delivered, to:
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

IRENE M
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights-]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
History: Const. 1896.

Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to
vote or hold office-]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of
public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof.
There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate
the State or interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or
for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification
shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in
this Constitution.
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30-3-3. Award ojf costs, attorney and witness
fees — Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4,
or 6, and in any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may order a
party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees,
including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody,
visitation, child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court
may order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and
maintenance of the other party and of any children in
the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry
of the final order or judgment may be amended during me course oi tne action or in the final order or
judgment.
1993
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continuing jurisdiction — Custody and
visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modifiCat
/i» u,u
\ ° n l E f f e c t i v e u ntii January 1, 19941.
u) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties The
i n d U d e thC f U 0 W i n g in e V e
d^rce
°
^ decre€ of
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
cnlt M n e r a g e i s a v a i 1 l a b l e * a reasonable
cost an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and denUl^care insurance for <he dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party U responsible for the payment of joint debts obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(u) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the courts division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
'(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of t h e property and
obligations for debts a s is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by t h e person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order t h e petitioner to pay t h e
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing
party in that action, if the court determines that the
petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance
. with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation.
1W3
Disposition of property — Maintenance and health care of parties and
children — Division of debts — Court
to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for
modification [Effective January 1,
19941.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The
court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce:

payment oi iw«..»-.v
^
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and
dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding
the court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of
these orders;
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5;
and
(e) with regard to child support orders issued
or modified on or after January 1,1994, that are
subject to income withholding, an order assessing
against the obligor an additional $7 per month
check processing fee to be included in the amount
withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services
for the purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5.
<2) The court may include, in an order determining
child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by t h e employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide the
day care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) T h e court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and
dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other members of the immediate
family, t h e court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However,
if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and h i s rights are determined.
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if
it is further established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is without
any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume.
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing
oartv in that action, if the court determines that the
petition w a s without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance
with a visitation order by a parent, a grandparent, or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may award
to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing
party because of the other party's failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation.
1993
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30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the.past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds t h a t one parent does not desire
custody of the child, or has attempted to permanently
relinquish custody to a third party, it shall take that
evidence into consideration in determining whether
to award custody to the other parent.
1993
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30-3-10.3. Terms of joint legal custody order.
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final
order of joint legal custody is entered when the plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is
administered as provided under Section 30-3-11.3,
both parties shall attend the mandatory course and
present a certificate of completion from the course to
the court.
(2) An order of joint legal custody shall provide
terms the court determines appropriate, which may
include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child,
until altered by further order of the court, or the
custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child;
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these
areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care,
support, and education;
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the
child's attendance at school and other activities,
his daily routine, and his association with
friends; and
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental
rights, privileges, duties, and powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or
jointly.
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the
order the terms agreed to between the parties.
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed
by the court order may be exercised by the parent
having physical custody of the child the majority of
the time.
(5) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians
does not impair or limit the authority of the court
to order support of the child, including payments
by one custodian to the other.
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is
not grounds for modifying a support order.
(c) The agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure the parties agree to use before
seeking enforcement or modification of the terms
and conditions of the order of joint legal custody
through litigation, except in emergency situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the
child.
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